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1. INTRODUCTION
Fiscal decentralisation has been one of the dis-
tinctive features of the Spanish public sector in re-
cent decades. Decentralisation commenced with
the approval of the Spanish Constitution in 1978.
This enabled the regional (autonomous) govern-
ments (RGs) to be set up and reformed the territo-
rial organisation of the State. Since then, responsi-
bilities for managing certain services have gradual-
ly been transferred from the State to the RGs and
the arrangements for financing these responsibili-
ties have been developed.
The design and implementation of fiscal poli-
cy in Spain, meanwhile, has been governed
since the mid-1990s by the need for budgetary
consolidation, first, to qualify for Stage Three of
Economic and Monetary Union and, subse-
quently, to comply with the Stability and Growth
Pact, whereby all EU countries must ensure
that their budgetary positions are close to bal-
ance in the medium term.
The need to reconcile these two elements
(fiscal decentralisation and budgetary consoli-
dation), has highlighted the usefulness of devel-
oping rules of fiscal discipline that bind the dif-
ferent levels of government, as well as creating
a regulatory environment for the RGs that en-
sures a degree of financial autonomy consistent
with the level of spending responsibilities as-
sumed.
It is against this background that two pieces
of legislation have recently been approved by
las Cortes (the Spanish parliament). These are,
the Budgetary Stability Law (1), which, inter
alia, strengthens the mechanisms for co-ordina-
tion between the State and the RGs, so that the
latter more closely participate in the general
macroeconomic stability objectives, and the
new arrangements for financing the ordinary-re-
gime RGs agreed by the Fiscal and Financial
Policy Council (CPFF) in July 2001, which con-
tain significant changes to the previous financ-
ing arrangements (2).
(1) Law 18/2001 of 12 December 2001 on general
budgetary stability and Organic Law 5/2001 of 13 Decem-
ber 2001, which supplements the general budgetary stabili-
ty law.
(2) This agreement has been enshrined in Organic Law
7/2001 of 27 December 2001 amending Organic Law 8/
1980 of 22 September 1980 on the financing of the regional
governments (LOFCA), and in Law 21/2001 of 27 Decem-
ber 2001 regulating the fiscal and administrative measures
of the new arrangements for financing the ordinary-regime
regional governments and towns with statutes of autonomy.
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This article analyses the content of both
pieces of legislation and their implications in
terms of the institutional environment within
which the RGs operate. Section two describes
the legislation and section three assesses it.
The article ends with a section of conclusions.
2. THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR
FINANCING THE RGS AND THE
BUDGETARY STABILITY LAW
The development of regional government, in
the case of the ordinary-regime RGs, com-
menced with the creation of pre-autonomous
entities and continued with the approval, in
1980, of the Organic Law on the Financing of
RGs (LOFCA), and of the respective autonomy
charters. Subsequently, the five-year agree-
ments on financing arrangements signed within
the CPFF have been the basis for the develop-
ment of the system of regional government. The
latest of them, reached in July 2001, estab-
lished new arrangements for financing the ordi-
nary-regime RGs, which came into force on
1 January 2002 and which, unlike the previous
arrangements, are intended to be a definitive
model.
These arrangements are based on two
fundamental elements: first, determination of
the resources corresponding to each RG in
the year taken as the base year (1999) (see
Table 1); and, second, definition of the rules
governing the future level of the resources of
each RG.
To determine the first of these elements,
the overall spending needs of the RGs are
established in accordance with the revenues
they received in the base year (3) and with
the amounts allocated to a set of supplemen-
tary funds with various objects (4). The
spending needs so defined are divided up
among the RGs on the basis of certain distri-
bution criteria (5), among which the relative
population variable is the most relevant. Sub-
sequently, the tax resources that will be avail-
able to the RGs to finance their spending are
defined and the amount they would have
been in the base year is estimated. Finally,
the so-called sufficiency fund is fixed. This
covers the difference between the spending
needs and the tax-raising capacity of each
RG in the base year and therefore enables
the system to be closed (6). This ensures that
the total resources of each RG in the base
year are equal to its previously defined
spending needs, thereby fulfilling one of the
requirements of the new agreement (7).
From this year, therefore, the RGs receive
percentages of the annual receipts from the as-
signed taxes and the sufficiency fund, the
amount of which shall vary according to the cri-
teria set out below. The figures for the base
year, on which the new agreement is founded,
are not currently available, however.
As regards the rules for the future levels of
resources, it is established that the sufficiency
fund shall be increased annually in accordance
with the rate of growth of state tax revenues
(ITE) (8) (9). At the same time, to avoid the ac-
cumulation of large disparities in the revenue
raising capacity of the different RGs, two rules
have been established to regulate their reve-
nues. First, the rate of growth of revenues of
the so-called general block of common respon-
sibilities (see Table 1) of each RG shall not ex-
ceed by more than 75% the average rate of
growth for all the RGs (10). Second, the growth
rate of these same revenues in those RGs
whose income per head is less than 70% of the
average income per head of the ordinary-re-
gime RGs, shall not be less than 120% of the
average rate of growth of all the ordinary-re-
(3) These revenues come from the general common re-
sponsibilities fund, the general health fund and the social
assistance fund
(4) These are the fund for RGs with low population den-
sity, the relative income fund, the sickness benefit saving
fund and the health cohesion fund.
(5) The distribution criteria vary from fund to fund.
(6) The sufficiency fund consists of a transfer from the
State to the RG, where the latter’s spending needs exceed
its tax-raising capacity in the base year, or, in the opposite
case, a transfer from the RG to the State.
(7) In addition, so-called minimum guarantees are es-
tablished whereby an RG cannot receive, in respect of
spending blocks (general common responsibilities fund, the
fund to relieve low population density, the general health
fund and the social assistance fund), an amount less than it
would have received under the previous arrangements.
(8) These include the State receipts, excluding those
that are assignable, from personal income tax, VAT and ex-
cise duties. In the event that the sufficiency fund is negative
(because the spending needs of the RG are less than its
tax-raising capacity), the negative transfer that the RG con-
cerned must make shall change in line with the tax reve-
nues of that RG (regional ITE, which includes the receipts in
the territory of the RG, without exercise of regulatory pow-
ers, in respect of personal income tax, VAT and excise du-
ties), provided that the rate of growth of the regional ITE is
less than that of the national ITE.
(9) The sufficiency fund established for the base year
will likewise be subject to review in the event of transfer to
the RG of new services and/ or assignment of taxes.
(10) In the event that this percentage is exceeded by
any RG, its resources shall be reduced to the limit set, pro-
vided that the reduction made as a consequence of this rule
shall not exceed 22.791% of their initial level. Also, when
the RG to which the adjustment is applied has more than
10% of all the population centres existing in the ordinary-re-
gime RGs, the excess over 75% of the average rate of
growth shall be multiplied by 0.49 to obtain the amount of
the adjustment.
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    FUND IN
THE BASE YEAR (S)
   ASSIGNED TAXES IN THE BASE YEAR  (T)
SOURCES OF FINANCING OF THE SYSTEM IN THE BASE YEAR (G=T+S)
HEALTH FUND:
 COMMON RESPONSIBILITIES
   FUNDS: 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RGs IN THE BASE YEAR (1999)
RG personal income tax schedule +
Share in State revenue +
Guarantee fund +
Assigned taxes and charges + 
Initial restriction for Andalusia, 
Castile-La Mancha and Extremadura 
€ 150.25 millionRELATIVE INCOME FUND
€ 48.08 million
Minimum of   39.66 million for 
 each RG. Rest according to:
Population (94%)
Area (4.2%)
 Dispersion (1.2%)
Insularity (0.6%)
RGs with density < 27 persons/km 
 area < 50,000 km
Relative income index
Covered population (75%)
Population >65 (24.5%)
Insularity (0.5%)
Covered population
GENERAL FUND
FUND FOR RGs WITH 
  LOW POPULATION 
DENSITY
GENERAL FUND
SICKNESS-BENEFIT 
SAVING FUND 
HEALTH COHESION
FUND
Amount for RGs with health responsibilities
Amount for 'direct management of Insalud'
 for other RGs
€ 240.40 million
Population > 65  
DETERMINATION OF THE GUARANTEED EXPENDITURE IN THE BASE YEAR 
CRITERIA FOR DISTRIBUTION
AMONG THE RGs
GUARANTEE EXPENDITURE IN THE BASE YEAR (G)
(Excluding sickness benefit saving fund)
   ASSIGNED TAXES IN THE BASE YEAR (T)
=
-
+
Determination of the resources corresponding to each regional goovernment
in the base year
TABLE 1
- Wealth tax
- Inheritance and gifts
- Property transfers
- Documented legal acts
- Charges
- Gaming
- 35% VAT
- 40% of excise duties on hydrocarbons, tobacco products, alcohol
  and beer
- 33% personal income tax 
- 100% of duty on electricity, vehicle registrations  and the new duty  
  on retail sales of hydrocarbons
  
          WELFARE FUND Amount for ordinary-regime RGs
2
2
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gime RGs (11). In addition, a rule is established
whereby RGs shall allocate to health spend-
ing (12) at least the initial financing established for
this item, increased in line with the growth rate of
the national ITE, so that all the resources of the fi-
nancing system are tied to compliance with this
requirement. Finally, during the first three years
that the agreement is in force, the state shall en-
sure, for those RGs that have assumed health re-
sponsibilities, that the resources allocated to this
item grow in line with nominal GDP.
Various features of the agreement should be
noted. First, the financing of health and social
services is included within the overall financing
system (13). Second, the weight of territorially
based tax resources in the financing of the RGs
is increased. In this respect, the percentage of
personal income tax assigned is raised to 33%
and, in addition, 35% of the net receipts from
VAT, 40% of those from excise duties on manu-
facture (14) and 100% of the duty on electricity,
of the new duty on the retail sales of hydrocar-
bons and of the duty on certain means of trans-
port are assigned (15). Moreover, the new sys-
tem extends the regulatory powers of the RGs
with regard to assigned taxes (see Table 2). The
most important modification relates to personal
income tax; the RGs are still able to set their own
schedule, subject to the sole restriction, under
the new system, that it is progressive and retains
the same number of brackets as that of the
State. Regulatory powers are not granted, how-
ever, over VAT and excise duties (16), except in
the case of the duty on certain means of trans-
port, where the RGs have the power to modify
the rate within certain limits, and the new duty on
hydrocarbons. Finally, the State guarantees for
minimum growth of the financial resources re-
ceived by each RG are abolished, subject to the
exceptions indicated for health spending during
the first three years the agreement is in force
and to the rules for adjusting revenues.
The new agreement also covers certain as-
pects of the channels of financing that remain
outside the system. First, it establishes so-called
levelling payments, whose purpose is to ensure a
minimum level of provision of health and educa-
tion services. In the event of a deviation of more
than three percentage points (17) from the na-
tional average annual percentage increase in the
number of pupils of school age or in the covered
population (18), negotiations shall be initiated to
analyse the appropriateness of allocating such
levelling payments. Second, the Inter-territorial
Compensation Fund (19) is maintained, subject
to two changes, namely to give Ceuta and Melilla
access to these funds and to enable them to be
used to finance not only investment spending but
also the current spending associated with such
investment. Finally, investment agreements and
programme contracts are maintained.
The agreement does not establish proce-
dures to co-ordinate central and regional fi-
nance departments in relation to general macr-
oeconomic objectives. However, these issues
are addressed by the Budgetary Stability Law.
The macroeconomic co-ordination between the
different levels of government has, until now,
been based on the rules in the LOFCA which
restrict the RGs’ capacity to borrow (20) and
which require them to present to the govern-
ment (through the CPFF) an annual borrowing
programme. Once this programme has been
agreed, all of the transactions contained therein
are automatically authorised by the State (21).
(11) For RGs whose income per head is between 70%
and 75% of the average income per head, the average rate
of growth of their financing shall be no less than 30% of the
average rate of growth of all the ordinary-regime RGs. For
those between 75% and 82%, this percentage is 22%.
(12) Excluding that part corresponding to the sickness
benefit saving fund.
(13) Under the previous system, health was financed
outside the financing system for the RGs. The Social Secu-
rity Treasury Department was the recipient and distributive
centre for all the resources, even in the case of RGs to
which this responsibility had been transferred (see Gordo
and Hernández de Cos (2000) for more details).
(14) Duties on beer, wine and fermented beverages;
duty on intermediate products and on alcohol and derivative
drinks; duties on tobacco products and the duty on hydro-
carbons.
(15) These percentages shall be applied to the net re-
ceipts obtained by the State in each region, the criterion for
distribution among the RGs being the territorial consump-
tion indices published by INE.
(16) According to the preamble of Law 7/2001 of 27 De-
cember 2001 which introduces the new Financing Agree-
ment, EU tax harmonisation prevents the RGs having fiscal
responsibilities, at least in the case of VAT and special du-
ties on manufacture.
(17) One percentage point when the area of the region
exceeds 90,000 km2.
(18) In this case, the covered population shall be age-
weighted.
(19) Law 22/2001of 27 December 2001 regulating the
Inter-territorial Compensation Funds.
(20) These restrictions are, first, that credit transactions
with a maturity of less than one year shall be used to cover
temporary cash requirements. Second, credit transactions
with a maturity of more than one year, whatever their form,
shall comply with the following requirements: a) the entire
amount of the credit shall be used to finance investment
spending; and b) the annual amount of the repayments plus
interest shall not exceed 25% of the current revenues of the
RG. Third, the RGs shall require State authorisation to enter
into credit transactions abroad, to issue debt and for any
other recourse to public credit.
(21) This programme can be modified while it is being
implemented by the RG, by means of a new proposal to the
Government. Moreover, the State itself may suspend the
programme as a precautionary measure in exceptional cir-
cumstances that may hamper the financial policy of the
Treasury or involve an imbalance between the level of ex-
ternal and domestic borrowing.
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These co-ordination mechanisms were
strengthened, from 1992, following the publica-
tion of the Spanish Convergence Programme,
with the signing of the so-called Budget Consol-
idation Scenarios (ECP) by the State and each
RG. These established the maximum deficits
and debts permitted for each RG, as deter-
mined by bilateral negotiations (22).
The Budgetary Stability Law, with effect from
2002, has modified some of these co-ordination
mechanisms, since it stipulates that each RG
shall comply with the principle of annual budg-
etary stability, defined as the need to maintain a
balanced budget or surplus. In the event of fail-
ure to do so, the RG shall justify the situation of
financial imbalance and draw up an economic/
financial plan to correct the situation, which
must be approved by the CPFF.
3. ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW
FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGIONAL
(AUTONOMOUS) GOVERNMENTS
The above-mentioned legislative changes
define a new framework for relations between
the State and the RGs, characterised by a
higher degree of financial autonomy for the
RGs and a stricter co-ordination mechanism,
which requires the RGs to participate in the
general macroeconomic objective of budgetary
stability.
TABLE 2
The regional governments’ regulatory powers over assigned taxes
Personal income tax
VAT
Wealth tax
Tax on inheritance
and gifts
Tax on property
transfers and docu-
mented legal acts
(stamp duty)
Tax on gaming
Excise duties on ma-
nufacture (a)
New duty on retail
sales of hydrocar-
bons
Duty on electricity
Vehicle registration
duty
33
35
100
100
100
100
40
100
100
100
They can regulate the rate schedule, the only limitation being that it must be progressive
and have the same number of brackets as the State one. Possibility of establishing deduc-
tions for personal and family circumstances, non-business investment and based on the
application of income. The 15% deduction for investment in a habitual residence is divided
into two tranches. The 5% regional one can be modified by the RGs by up to 50%.
No regulatory powers have been granted.
They can set the level of the tax-free allowance and the rate schedule, without limitation, and
create such deductions and allowances as they wish, while respecting those of the State.
They can create reductions in the tax base for mortis causa and intervivos transfers, while
maintaining those of the State. They can regulate the rate structure without limitation.
They can establish the amount and coefficients applicable to estates without limitation.
They can create deductions and allowances, while respecting those of the State.
As regards transfers of property for consideration, they can regulate the rate charged
on the transfer of personal and real property and on the creation and transfer of real
rights, other than collateral ones, thereover, and on the rental of personal and real
property. In relation to documented legal acts, they can regulate the rate charged on
notarial documents. They can create deductions and allowances, while respecting
those of the State, but only in those areas where they have regulatory capacity over
the rate of charge.
They can regulate exemptions, the tax base, the rate schedule, fixed charges, allowanc-
es and accrual.
No regulatory powers have been granted.
In the case of petrol and diesel fuel, the RGs can increase it by up to €10 per 1000 litres
in 2001 (€17 in 2003 and €24 in 2004). For agricultural diesel fuel and heating oil, by up
to €2.5 per 1000 litres (€4.25 and €6 in 2003 and 2004, respectively). For fuel oil, up to
€0.4 per tonne (€0.7 and €1 in 2003 and 2004, respectively).
No regulatory powers have been granted.
They can adjust the rate schedule, subject to certain limits.
Tax % assigned Scope of regulatory powers
(a) Duties on beer, wine and fermented beverages, intermediate products, alcohol and derived drinks, tobacco products and hydrocar-
bons.
(22) In March 1995, following the revision of the Con-
vergence Programme, the ECP commitments were also re-
vised, with the limits being set for the period 1995-1997. Fi-
nally, the latter were again changed with the approval of the
first Stability and Growth Programme in December 1998.
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These measures are assessed below in the
light of a number of criteria considered essential
for the smooth operation of decentralised sys-
tems of government, namely: uniformity, stability,
generality, financial autonomy, fiscal co-responsi-
bility, sufficiency of resources, inter-territorial soli-
darity, co-ordination and transparency. A defini-
tive assessment of the Financing Agreement will
need to be made, however, when the figures on
which it has been based become available.
The financing model approved introduces a
uniform system for all the ordinary-regime RGs.
This uniformity should be considered desirable
as, from the viewpoint of economic rationality,
the persistence of different levels of powers and
financing regimes does not seem justified. Ac-
cordingly, within the State, only the specific-sta-
tus RGs have a different financing system.
Moreover, the new system is, by nature, defini-
tive and stable, in contrast to the high degree of
instability of the previous five-year agreements,
which is appropriate given the conclusion of the
process of transferring spending powers from
the State to the RGs. Obviously, as recognised
in the agreement, this will not prevent the future
introduction of modifications that may be con-
sidered necessary in the light of experience
with the new system.
Also notable is the significant advance en-
tailed by the integration of health financing in
the overall regional financing arrangements. In
this respect, when health, like other public serv-
ices, became financed solely through State
transfers under the provisions of the Social Se-
curity System Consolidation and Rationalisation
Law, which came into force in 1997, it did not
seem justified for health financing to remain
separate from the rest of regional financing. In
relation to health spending, however, the new
model establishes a significant special feature
in that it requires the RGs to assign annually to
the financing of health services at least the
base-year amount increased in line with the
growth of the national ITE, with all the resourc-
es of the system being subject to compliance
with this rule. Thus, although health is integrat-
ed in the overall system of financing, this
spending has a different treatment from that of
other spending items. Indeed, the establish-
ment of a minimum rate of growth for this com-
ponent of public spending seems to preclude
effective measures being introduced to curb its
recent growth trend. This minimum rate of
growth is also equal for all the RGs, irrespective
of any differences that may arise in the future
behaviour of the variables determining the level
of health spending in the RGs.
From the standpoint of the financial autono-
my of the RGs, the new system reduces their
dependence on State transfers and broadens
their tax structure, thereby correcting the lack of
synchrony between spending decentralisation
and the system for financing the RGs, the
former being more developed than the latter.
Moreover the degree of financial autonomy will
be more similar across the RGs, since the dis-
tribution of consumption across regions is more
even than the distribution of income and, as in-
dicated in the previous section, higher decen-
tralisation percentages have been set for VAT
and excise duties (the taxes most closely linked
to consumption) than for personal income tax.
Meanwhile, the choice of VAT and excise
duties as assignable taxes, involves a change
from the previous tendency for tax decentralisa-
tion to affect mainly wealth and income taxa-
tion. This decision should be seen in the con-
text of the loss of weight of direct taxation in to-
tal public revenues and the increase in that of
indirect taxation. This shift in the sources of fi-
nancing has, in the past, given rise to certain
problems of financial insufficiency for the RGs.
These have been resolved by various devices
(e.g. the establishment of guarantees), which
reduced the incentives for the RGs to use their
regulatory powers, thus eliminating fiscal co-re-
sponsibility. In relation to health spending, how-
ever, this type of guarantee has been retained,
albeit temporarily, since, as indicated, the new
model establishes that the State will guarantee
that the minimum rate of growth of financing al-
located to this expenditure shall be equal to the
nominal rate of growth of GDP during the first
three years of the financing system.
The new agreement increases the degree of
fiscal co-responsibility, partially widening the
regulatory powers over personal income tax
and the other assigned taxes (excluding VAT
and excise duties), and eliminating the guaran-
tees for the rate of growth of personal income
tax. In this respect, the diversification of the tax-
es assigned to the RGs reduces the need for
these guarantees, since revenues will be less
dependent on the behaviour of a particular tax.
Following the elimination of the guarantees, the
RGs will therefore have to assume the risk of
revenue losses associated with these taxes.
With respect to the financial sufficiency of
the RGs, the system ensures that the volume of
resources will be at least equivalent to that re-
ceived under the previous financing model.
However, the choice of a single year to calcu-
late the revenue-raising capacity of the as-
signed taxes and the sufficiency fund for each
RG may introduce distortions into the structure
of financing in the base year that may be ex-
tended into the future. Indeed, tax receipts in a
particular year are necessarily subject to tem-
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porary disturbances, which may partly be cycli-
cal and which may not be uniform across the
RGs. Meanwhile, the level of the sufficiency
fund is also affected by the base year chosen,
as it is calculated as the difference between the
spending requirements and revenue-raising ca-
pacity in that year, so that if the latter is excep-
tionally high, the amount of the fund will be be-
low the desired level and vice versa.
The new model establishes two mechanisms
to ensure inter-regional solidarity. The first is
the sufficiency fund which, owing to its method
of calculation in the base year ensures a trade-
off between its per-capita level and the income
per capita of each RG. Moreover, the decision
to link the size of the fund to the growth of State
tax revenues enables the revenue effects of
specific shocks to a particular region to be part-
ly offset. Given that the weight of this fund is
negatively related to income, a larger part of the
revenues of lower-income RGs will be guaran-
teed by the growth of the total income of the
economy. The second element of inter-territorial
solidarity is provided by the adjustment mecha-
nisms. These limit the effects of the differences
in the growth of the different regions on tax re-
ceipts and, therefore, on the level and sufficien-
cy of the public services provided. These rules
are also strengthened by the so-called levelling
payments and, of course, by the Inter-territorial
Compensation Fund.
In any event, the degree of solidarity of the
new system depends on a complex set of fac-
tors. The application of criteria for the distribu-
tion of the resources that differ from one block
of responsibilities to another, the establishment
of a minimum amount to be received by each
RG, the setting of minimum guarantees which
mean that, for each block of spending, each RG
must receive at least the amounts received un-
der the previous system in the base year, and
the existence of various funds that supplement
the general ones (the fund for RGs with low
population density, the relative income fund, the
sickness benefit saving fund, the health cohe-
sion fund) and of resources that remain outside
the system (basically, the Inter-territorial Com-
pensation Fund and European Union funds) are
all involved in determining the inter-regional sol-
idarity in the new system.
From the standpoint of transparency, the
present formulation of the agreement does not
resolve some of the problems that have been
detected as the regional project has been de-
veloped in relation to the availability of statisti-
cal information on the regional governments.
The application of the new system involves a
further reduction in the number of transactions
channelled through the State, the only agent,
up until now, that has supplied regular informa-
tion on its budget outturn. There is therefore a
risk of loss of information on the activities of
general government in Spain.
The progress made in decentralising public
expenditure and the financing of the RGs has
required, as indicated, the institution of mecha-
nisms for macroeconomic co-ordination be-
tween the State and the RGs. Until now the lim-
its set for the borrowing and deficits of the RGs
have generally been respected. In fact, borrow-
ing by the RGs has not reached worrying levels,
although it is on a rising trend (see Chart 1).
Nonetheless, the aforementioned mechanisms
may not be sufficiently strict in a setting of activ-
ity growth channelled through the RGs. In this
respect, the procedures in force do not provide
a precise definition of the co-ordination rules,
nor is there any agency responsible for super-
vising compliance. In the event that limits are
breached there are no sanctioning mecha-
nisms. Meanwhile, the restrictions on borrowing
set in the Budget Consolidation Scenarios are
the result of bilateral agreements between each
RG and central government, without there be-
ing any apparent objective criteria for their de-
termination. They are not public in and they are
capable of revision. All this may give rise to a
sub-optimal set of incentives.
The entry into force of the budgetary stability
law could resolve some of these shortcomings.
In particular, the law establishes a single non-ne-
gotiable limit for all the RGs, requiring them to
keep their budgets in balance or surplus. The net
lending/net borrowing to which the aforemen-
tioned limit refers is defined in accordance with
the European System of National and Regional
Accounts, so that a defined accounting principle
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CHART 1
   Source: Banco de España.
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is stipulated. Also, within regional and local gov-
ernment, the principle of budgetary stability is
applicable to corporations and public-law estab-
lishments reporting to the RGs. Finally, a proce-
dure has been introduced for those cases in
which there is a deficit, requiring the RG at fault
to draw up an economic/financial plan to correct
it. A sanctioning mechanism has also been es-
tablished insofar as if, as a result of this imbal-
ance, Spain infringes its obligations under the
Stability and Growth Pact, the RG concerned
shall assume the responsibility arising from such
breach. In addition, the law provides that the au-
thorisation of the State to the RGs to enter into
credit transactions and to issue debt shall take
into account the achievement of the targets, so
that, the use of this power of authorisation is ex-
pressly highlighted as an incentive mechanism
for achieving the targets.
From the standpoint of the balanced budget
target, it should be taken into account that the
growth of the resources of the RGs is more de-
pendent on the business cycle following the en-
try into force of the new financing agreement
since, as discussed above, it has increased the
weight of tax revenues in their total financing
and the financial guarantees for the growth of
their resources have disappeared. Accordingly,
achievement of the annual balanced budget tar-
get requires the RGs to maintain fiscal surplus-
es at times of economic expansion, to enable
them to absorb the foreseeable decline in tax
resources during economic slowdowns and to
avoid the need for pro-cyclical discretionary
measures.
Finally, it should be remembered that an es-
sential element in the appropriate implementa-
tion of any fiscal decentralisation programme is
a guarantee of information transparency in rela-
tion to the activities of regional and local gov-
ernment. In the Spanish case, this need for
transparency is, if possible, even greater owing
to the size of the spending and tax responsibili-
ties assumed by the RGs relative to the activi-
ties of the public sector as a whole. In this re-
spect, the Budgetary Stability Law provides for
the creation of an information centre to supply
data on credit transactions, the issuance of debt
and other recourse to credit or risk assumed by
the RGs. Nonetheless, it is also necessary to
ensure the periodic publication of information
on the activities of the regional governments on
the same conditions as information is currently
provided by central government, so that fiscal
decentralisation does not lead to a reduction in
the information available and the various activi-
ties of the public sector can be effectively moni-
tored.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The regional financing agreement and the
Budgetary Stability Law came into force on 1
January 2002, establishing a new framework for
the RGs and their relations with the State. On
one hand, the RGs now have a uniform, stable
and comprehensive financing system that in-
creases their financial autonomy and the level
of fiscal co-responsibility. On the other hand,
and in response to the significant level of reve-
nue and spending responsibilities assumed by
the RGs, mechanisms have been put in place
to ensure that they participate fully in fiscal con-
solidation and in complying with the obligations
under the Stability and Growth Pact.
As in the case of the State, the maintenance
of a balanced budget will require the RGs to
achieve sufficiently large surpluses in times of
economic boom, since their resources depend
to a larger extent on tax receipts and will, there-
fore, be more sensitive to the business cycle.
However, under the new model, the RGs are in
a better position to adjust their revenue to their
desired spending.
Against this background, given the impor-
tance that the activity of the RGs will have and
the relevance of the principle of transparency in
ensuring that public-sector activities are control-
led, it would seem necessary to make improve-
ments to the budgetary information mecha-
nisms of the RGs, in order to guarantee period-
ic publication of information on their activities on
the same conditions, and with the same detail
and periodicity, as that currently provided by
central government.
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